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In the wake of the recent oil disaster in the Gulf, Congress appears 
poised to impose new bans on offshore drilling along with a strict 
new regulatory regime. While these measures may meet a widely felt 
need for swift retribution, there is an alternative policy response that 
can both correctly assign liability and create stronger incentives for 
uncompromised safety among offshore operators.
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY?
Keep perspective on 
probability - and cost - of 
offshore drilling accidents
Avoid temptation to 
over-regulate
Have offshore operators bear 
full liability for accidents by 
removing the current $75 
million liability cap
Require offshore operators 
to provide insurance 
guaranteeing full liability 
coverage
In a stroke of grim irony, just as the 
Obama Administration is relaxing 
restrictions on offshore oil drilling, 
comes the largest oil spill since the 
wreckage of the Exxon Valdez off 
the Alaskan coast in 1989.  Despite 
BP’s efforts to stem the flow and 
contain the huge slick, almost 
100,000 barrels of oil have already 
spewed from the Gulf’s floor, with 
potentially grave environmental 
consequences. 
As evidenced from recent 
Congressional hearings, we can 
expect a spate of new regulations 
designed to avoid future spills. The 
simple truth is that the BP accident 
is an extremely low probability, 
extremely high cost event. 
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, 
there have been more than 36,000 oil wells 
drilled in the Gulf. Yet since exploration in 
the Gulf of Mexico began in the 1950’s, there 
has been only one accident to compare with 
BP’s ill-fated Deepwater Horizon.  After the 
blowout of the PEMEX IXTOC I well in 1979 
off the coast of Mexico, oil spilled into the Gulf 
at a rate of 10,000 to 30,000 barrels per day 
until it was finally capped nine months later 
(www.incidentnews.gov/incident/6250). 
Equally important is the fact that the costs 
of this disaster will be staggering, with BP 
estimating that its costs have already exceeded 
$450 million.
Research on low probability/high cost events 
tells us that prior to a catastrophe, it is human 
nature to underestimate both the probability 
of its occurrence and the resulting damage. 
Yet, when such catastrophes do happen, 
we over-react in the opposite direction. We 
overestimate the probability of such an event 
and its expected costs. Congress is running 
in this latter mode, and we can expect a 
flood of new regulations on offshore drilling. 
Hopefully, cooler heads will prevail.  
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COOL THE REACTION
It matters critically what form these new 
regulations will take. Two general types are to 
be expected. First, the Obama Administration 
is likely to re-impose drilling restrictions 
in the offshore areas it had only recently 
opened for exploration. Second, Congress 
undoubtedly will attempt to impose new 
safety regulations. These could include 
requiring the Department of Energy to 
provide detailed engineering specifications on 
the design of blow-out preventers and other 
critical equipment. Or, Congress could require 
the continuous surveillance of offshore 
drilling operations by a government safety 
inspector. The options being discussed are 
endless, but they all fall under the rubric of 
“command and control.”   
The underlying logic of “command and 
control” is that offshore oil operators either 
do not have the expertise to adopt safe 
practices, or they know better but choose 
to cut corners in the absence of detailed 
regulations. Let’s examine these two 
propositions. 
The BP accident is an 
extremely low probability, 
extremely high cost event.
The policy options being 
discussed are endless, 
but they all fall under the 
rubric of “command and 
control.” 
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First, who has more expertise in designing 
offshore equipment and operating offshore 
rigs — the government, or the offshore 
oil industry?  The answer is obvious. That 
leaves us with the explanation that without 
“commands and controls” offshore oil 
operators will knowingly cut corners. Is 
it possible that either BP, the drilling rig 
owner, or the manufacturer of the blow-out 
preventer chose to cut corners? Yes. It is 
possible, too, that the cause of the accident 
was a combination of complex conditions that 
could not have been reasonably foreseen. We 
may never know for certain exactly what led 
to the accident. But whatever the cause, we 
need to ensure that corners are never cut in 
the future.
There is a policy alternative to outright bans 
on exploration or to costly “command and 
control” policies, and it relies primarily upon 
markets. It answers the question, “How do we 
make it in the oil company’s best interests to 
invest in the optimal amount of safety and not 
to cut corners?” 
ASSIGN FULL LIABILITY 
To align incentives correctly, the oil company 
must expect to bear the full costs of spills 
and disasters like the one happening now. 
Aware of the risk of facing enormous costs, 
companies will have strong incentives to 
make the engineering and safety decisions 
appropriate for the drilling situation at hand. 
These decisions no doubt will vary with the 
water depth and conditions of each drill site. 
The drilling companies have the means to get 
the best information, and they have the most 
resources invested, to assess the risk/damage 
tradeoff accurately.
Yet as it is now, offshore oil operators do not 
expect to bear the full costs of a disaster. The 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 makes operators 
liable for cleanup costs, but sets a $75 million 
(per oil spill) limit on their liability to other 
kinds of claims. BP’s current losses have 
already exceeded $450 million, and oil is still 
leaking from the ocean floor. An offshore 
operator may well make different safety 
decisions if its claims liability threatens 
to exceed $450 million than if liability is 
limited to$75 million. We can applaud BP 
for its stance that it will pay the full cost of 
the disaster. But other operators may not 
accept full liability, and even BP may not have 
taken full liability into account when making 
internal decisions about safety practices.  
NEEDED POLICY CHANGES
•	 Lift	the	current	$75	million	limited	
liability	ceiling
Offshore operators should expect to 
be responsible for the full costs of any 
environmental damage related to their 
activities.
There is one hitch: smaller offshore 
companies could accept full liability but 
then take shelter under bankruptcy laws 
in the event of a disaster. This means some 
additional steps must be taken.  
•	 Require	offshore	operators	to	provide	
insurance	by	a	reputable	company	
As it is now, offshore oil 
operators do not expect 
to bear the full costs of a 
disaster.  
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In addition to removing any limits on liability, 
Congress should require that any offshore 
operator provide an insurance policy 
guaranteeing full liability coverage. 
Full liability insurance not only protects 
taxpayers from bearing the cost of cleaning 
up environmental disasters, it also adds 
another layer of protection against future 
disasters. You can bet that private insurers 
like Lloyds of London would inspect very 
carefully the safety practices of those it 
insures. Furthermore, by relying on private 
markets, taxpayers are saved the expense of 
monitoring offshore operations. Full liability 
without the option of invoking bankruptcy 
laws assures that offshore operators will have 
no incentives to cut corners. 
A great advantage of this proposal is that 
it leaves the decision of how best to avoid 
disasters to the most knowledgeable agents 
involved: the oil operators and their insurers. 
These are relatively simple changes to make, 
and in principle the requirements involved 
are no different from those any homebuyer 
would expect of her builder.  
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